Working Spouse Entitled to Compensation on Divorce for Financial Support of Spouse Pursuing Professional Degree, In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918 (Wis.) by Hummel, Jill Rubin
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 3 
January 1983 
Working Spouse Entitled to Compensation on Divorce for 
Financial Support of Spouse Pursuing Professional Degree, In re 
Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918 (Wis.) 
Jill Rubin Hummel 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jill Rubin Hummel, Working Spouse Entitled to Compensation on Divorce for Financial Support of Spouse 
Pursuing Professional Degree, In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918 (Wis.), 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 879 
(1983). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss3/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WORKING SPOUSE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION ON DIVORCE
FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF SPOUSE PURSUING
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
In Re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982)
In In re Marriage of Lundberg,1 a divorce action, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized a statutory2 right to compensation of a
spouse who financially supports the other spouse pursuing a profes-
sional graduate degree
Petitioner Judy Lundberg requested compensation for financial sup-
port she provided her husband while he attended medical school.4 The
trial court awarded her a lump-sum maintenance award.' The appel-
late court reversed, holding that no Wisconsin authority supported a
gross alimony award, and alternatively, that the amount of compensa-
tion awarded was improper because it exceeded the value of the marital
assets.' The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and held: Wisconsin
divorce statutes governing property division and maintenance pay-
ments7 authorize compensation to a spouse who has supported the fam-
ily during the other spouse's enrollment in professional school.'
Working spouses have only recently begun to seek compensation in
divorce proceedings for amounts contributed to their spouse's educa-
tion.9 A majority of jurisdictions, however, deny the working spouse
1. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
2. Divorce Reform Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.255, 247.26 (West 1975). See infra note 25.
3. 107 Wis. 2d at 10, 318 N.W.2d at 922.
4. The Lundbergs married in late 1970 during the husband's last year of college. Mrs.
Lundberg received her Master's Degree in English in 1972, at which time she began teaching. The
same year, her husband entered medical school. Mrs. Lundberg supported both of them and
performed most of the household chores. Id. at 3-5, 318 N.W.2d at 919-20.
Mr. Lundberg graduated from medical school in 1976. In August, 1978, Mrs. Lundberg filed a
petition for divorce. Because the divorce occurred shortly after Mr. Lundberg completed medical
school, the couple had acquired few marital assets. Id. at 3-5, 318 N.W.2d at 919-20.
5. Id. at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
6. Id. at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920-21.
7. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 247.255, 247.26 (West 1975).
8. 107 Wis. 2d at 10, 318 N.W.2d at 922.
9. The case of a working spouse supporting a student spouse is hardly a new phenomenon.
As one writer has noted "'[p]utting hubby through' college, law school, medical school or other
educational program ('getting a Ph.T.' as it is sometimes called), appears to be a firmly entrenched
American Institution, despite the women's liberation movement." Erickson, Spousal Support To-
wards the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 947, 948 n.4.
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compensation. These courts hold that neither the professional degree
or license attained by the student spouse, nor the resulting increased
earning capacity constitutes marital property ° subject to division on
dissolution of the marriage." Courts refusing to recognize the degree
as a marital asset generally employ one of five rationales. 2 First,
courts have held that a professional degree lacks the traditional attrib-
utes of property, such as transferability and objective market value.' 3
10. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) (law
degree); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969) (same); In re Marriage of
Graham, 174 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc) (business degree); In re Marriage of Gold-
stein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981) (medical license); In re Marriage of
McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980) (law degree); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365
N.E.2d 792 (1977) (Ph.D. degree); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (law degree);
Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972) (medical license); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio
App. 164,428 N.E.2d 445 (1980) (same); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (rex. Civ. App. 1981)
(same).
11. The classification of a state's property distribution statute often influences whether a
court can classify a degree as a marital asset. In strict common law jurisdictions (Florida, Missis-
sippi, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia), the court may distribute property only accord-
ing to title of ownership. Thus a degree cannot constitute marital property in common law states.
Those courts ignore equitable considerations, such as one spouse's contribution toward the other
spouse's degree.
In community property jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas and Washington), all property acquired during the marriage is prop-
erty of the marital community and is divided equally upon divorce. A wife's contribution to her
husband's professional education will not affect the property distribution, unless the court classi-
fies the degree as an asset vested in the community.
Courts in the thirty-eight "equitable distribution" jurisdictions (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wis-
consin and Wyoming) consider all relevant factors, both financial and non-financial, in determin-
ing the property division. See Erickson, supra note 9, at 961-64 (describing the three different
marital property regimes); Foster & Freed, Divorce in the Fity States: An Overview as of,4ugust 1,
1980, 6 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4043, 4050-52 (1980) (classifying each type of property distribution
statute). See also Note, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon
Divorce, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 519-24 (1981) (discussing the various types of property
distribution statutes).
12. See Moore, Should a Professional Degree Be Considered a MaritalAsset Upon Divorce?,
15 AKRON L. RaV. 543, 545-53 (1982). See also infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc).
The Colorado Supreme Court in Graham held that although a wife contributed up to seventy
percent of the family expenses while her husband earned his master's degree in business adminis-
tration, the degree did not constitute marital property. Id. at 431-32, 574 P.2d at 76-77. Reason-
ing that a degree was not a "traditional" form of property, the court ruled that the Colorado
divorce statute gave it no authority to distribute proceeds from the degree as a marital asset. Id. at
432, 574 P.2d at 77. See generally Comment, Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject
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Second, courts have argued that the intangible nature of the degree
renders any property valuation highly speculative. 4 Third, some juris-
dictions reason that the financial implications of classifying a degree as
marital property may discourage the degree holder from entering less
lucrative fields within a chosen profession. 5 Fourth, courts often per-
ceive alimony as a better means of compensating the spouse for assist-
ance provided toward the degree holder's professional education.' 6
Fifth, some courts determine that valuing the degree is tantamount to
dividing post-dissolution earnings. '
7
Recently, an increasing number of jurisdictions have awarded com-
pensation to the working spouse,18 generally relying on four legal theo-
to Division Upon Divorce: In re Marriage of Graham, 11 CONN. L. REv. 62 (1978); Comment, In
re Marriage of Graham: Education Acquired During Marriage-for Richer or PoorerZ 12 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 709 (1979).
14. See, e.g, Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). In Todd, a
California appellate court held that the intangible nature of a degree renders it incapable of valua-
tion. Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The court refused to recognize one spouse's degree as
community property, even though community funds had partially paid for the degree. Califor-
nia's community property law formed the basis for the Todd court's decision. The court stated:
[T]he word 'property,' as used in the code sections relating to community property, does
not encompass every property right acquired by either husband or wife during marriage
.... The right to practice medicine and similar professions, for instance, is a property
right but it is not one which could be classed as community property.
272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969) (quoting Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945)).
The court also noted that Mrs. Todd had already received the benefits of her husband's educa-
tion. The court awarded Mrs. Todd 55% of the community assets, which primarily arose from Mr.
Todd's income as an attorney. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 789, 795, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134, 137 (1969).
15. See, e.g., DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980). See infra note 24.
Whether a professional education is and will be a future value to its recipient is a matter
resting on factors which are at best difficult to anticipate and measure. A person quali-
fied by education for a given profession may choose not to practice it, may fail at it, or
may practice in a specialty, location or manner which generates less than the average
income enjoyed by fellow professionals. The potential worth of the education may never
be realized for these or many other reasons. An award based on the prediction of the
degree holder's access at the chosen field may bear no relationship to the reality he or she
faces after the divorce.
Id. at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
16. See, etg., Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978).
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
18. See In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (future earning capacity
resulting from law degree constitutes marital property); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979), 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Nov. 23, 1982) (digest of opinion) (dental license
constitutes marital property), modoed 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2329 (Ky. Ct. App. March 12, 1982)
(digest of opinion), rev'don other grounds,; Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1053 (Mass. P. &
Fain. Ct. 1981) (case summary) (license to practice orthodontia is a marital asset); Vaclav v.
Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 293 N.W.2d 613 (1980) (medical degree constitutes marital asset);
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ries to justify the award.' 9 Some courts, disagreeing with the reasoning
employed by the majority of jurisdictions, treat the professional degree
or license as marital property subject to division upon divorce. 20 The
Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (same); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309
N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (wife entitled to restitution for contributions made toward the attain-
ment of her husband's degree); In re Cropp, 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2957 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979)
(digest of opinion) (wife granted lump-sum settlement as restitution for putting husband through
professional school); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 5,
1980), rev'd 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (professional degree unequivocally constitutes a
marital asset); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.) (wife not
entitled to reimbursement for supporting her husband during professional school-rehabilitative
alimony the appropriate remedy), rep'dinpart, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Hill v. Hill, 182
N.J. Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072 (App. Div.) (1982) (wife awarded rehabilitative alimony as com-
pensation for putting husband through dental school), modfed, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537; Hub-
bard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979) (wife entitled to reimbursement for contributions
made to attainment of husband's degree).
Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Lundberg, several of these cases have been
either modified or overruled by the state's highest court. See Inman v. Inman, 9 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2131 (Ky. Nov. 23, 1982) (digest of opinion) (before the state supreme court on the "law of
the case" rule); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510,453 A.2d 539 (1982) (reversing the lower court); Maho-
ney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 543 A.2d 527 (1982) (modifying the decision of the lower court).
The Lundberg case will be analyzed in light of the law existing at the time of the decision. Thus,
the Inman,Mahoney and Lynn holdings are discussed as they existed pre-Lundberg. For a discus-
sion of those cases' subsequent history, see infra notes 20 & 22.
19. Cf. Moore, supra note 12, at 544. Dr. Moore divides the potential legal theories into four
categories: (1) the degree as marital asset; (2) restitution; (3) alimony; and (4) the equitable divi-
sion of tangible assets.
20. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), modfied, 8 FAM. L, REP.
(BNA) 2329 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1982) (digest of opinion), rep'd on other grounds, 9 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Nov. 23, 1982) (digest of opinion). In Inman a Kentucky appellate court
first held that a professional degree constitutes marital property subject to distribution upon di-
vorce when the marriage partners have not accumulated other tangible assets. The court reasoned
that when a couple has accumulated no marital assets, the degree-earning spouse may well receive
a "windfall of contribution." Id. at 268. The court valued the degree as the amount the working
spouse actually expended in support, plus interest. Subsequently, in Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d
710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the Kentucky appellate court refused to broaden its Inman ruling, and
held that a degree did not constitute marital property when the couple had accumulated substan-
tial marital assets. Id. at 712.
After the Lundberg decision, Kentucky Supreme Court reversed Inman on other grounds (the
"law of the case" rule). Inman v. Inman, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Nov. 23, 1982) (digest
of opinion). Therefore, the lower court's holding that a degree constitutes a marital asset re-
mained theoretically intact. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that if it were con-
fronted with the issue, it would rule that a degree does not constitute marital property. Id. at 2133.
Instead, it would authorize compensation based on the wife's contribution toward the degree, as
well as the potential for increased earning capacity. Id.
See also Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 5, 1980),
rev'd, 91 NJ. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982). In Lynn, a New Jersey superior court held that the term
property is sufficiently broad to include an educational degree acquired with the use of marital
funds. Id. at 3006. The court valued the asset as the difference between the earning capacity of a
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spouse is awarded a portion of the degree's determined worth as part of
the property settlement. Other courts award compensation on the basis
of the potential earning capacity of the degree-holding spouse.2 Em-
ploying a restitutionary theory, some courts treat the professional de-
gree as a marital asset. These courts use a "quasi-loan" analysis to
award the supporting spouse the amount contributed toward the acqui-
sition of the degree.22 A few courts employ a rehabilitative alimony
theory to award the working spouse maintenance to obtain the educa-
tion and skills necessary to increase earning capacity.23
male with a four year college degree and that of a specialist in internal medicine. Id. at 3007.
Another New Jersey court, however, refused to characterize a degree as a marital asset and advo-
cated the use of rehabilitative alimony as an appropriate method for compensating the working
spouse. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 257 (1982).
The New Jersey Supreme Court resolved this conflict when it reviewed Mahoney and Lynn and
held that the term "property," as used in New Jersey's equitable distribution statute, does not
encompass an educational degree. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. at 492, 453 A.2d at 529. Lynn
as a companion case to Mahoney, was therefore overruled.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not overrule that part of Mahoney dealing with the issue of
rehabilitative alimony. The court stated, however, that insofar as rehabilitative alimony is not
always appropriate (i.e., where the wife is unable to return to the job market), "reimbursement"
alimony is the preferred means of compensation. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. For a discussion of
rehabilitative alimony see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
21. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), established the Iowa rule
that the increase in earning capacity, rather than the professional degree per se, constitutes the
marital asset. The court determined that the value of this asset equaled the actual cost of ob-
taining the degree, and awarded that amount as part of the property settlement. Id. at 891. See
generally Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital
Proper'v, 56 DEN. L.J. 677 (1979).
22. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). In Hubbard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the wife had an
equitable claim for repayment of the investment she had made in her husband's education. 603
P.2d at 751-52. The court argued that to hold otherwise would result in the unjust enrichment of
the husband. Thus, the court awarded Mrs. Hubbard a lump sum settlement in lieu of a property
division.
The court stressed that the award represented compensation for her "past investment rather
than a 'vested interest' in his future earnings." Id. at 752. See generally Note, Domestic Relations:
Recognition of a Wife's Interest in Professional Degree Earned by Husband During Marriage, 7 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 183 (1981) (containing an analysis of Hubbard).
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Lundberg, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982), articulated another basis similar to resti-
tution for compensating a wife who supported her husband while he obtained a graduate degree-
"reimbursement" alimony. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. Under this theory, a wife is entitled to
reimbursement of that amount which she contributed toward her husband's degree.
23. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act [U.M.D.A.] incorporates the concept of rehabili-
tative alimony. Section 308 of the U.M.D.A. provides in pertinent part:
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Lundberg,24
considered some of these theories before basing its award of compensa-
tion to the working spouse for financial support of the degree-earning
spouse on the Wisconsin Divorce Reform Act.25 Examining the factors
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court
deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant fac-
tors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and the
extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a
sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b), 9 U.L.A. 160 (1973). Eight states have adopted
§ 308(b)(2) of the U.M.D.A. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (1976); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-
10-114 (1973 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.200 (Baldwin 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (West
1981). See also Erickson, supra note 9, at 952 n.21.
A New Jersey superior court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App.
Div.), rev'dinpar, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982), advocated the use of "rehabilitative alimony"
as the proper remedy for the working spouse. Id. at 611-12, 442 A.2d at 1070. Though the court
refused to characterize a degree as a marital asset, it recognized that many women defer their own
training or education to support a degree-earning spouse. Thus, upon divorce, these women have
lower earning capacities than their husbands. Id. at 615, 442 A.2d at 1071-72.
The wife in Mahoney did not request rehabilitative alimony. Id at 603, 442 A.2d at 1065.
Rather, the court independently suggested that it was the appropriate remedy. Id at 615, 442
A.2d at 1071-72. See also Hill v. Hill, 182 NJ. Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072 (1982). In Hill, decided
the same day as Mahoney, the wife requested rehabilitative alimony so that she could attend
dental school. The court granted her request, stating, "[a]s we noted in Mahoney, this is a singu-
larly appropriate technique in a situation such as this where the wife, after the failure of the
marriage, seeks to enhance her own income capacity by pursuing education or professional objec-
fives." Id. at 620, 442 A.2d at 1074. For a discussion of subsequent history ofMahoney, see supra
note 20.
24. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982). In DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d
761 (Ct. App. 1980), the Wisconsin appellate court decided a wife's claim to compensation for the
financial support of her husband while he pursued a law degree. The trial court classified the
degree as a marital asset. The appellate court reversed and held that a degree is not "property"
within the meaning of the existing property distribution statute. While the court stated that the
wife's financial contribution to her husband's degree is a relevant factor in determining property
division and maintenance the court asserted that under no circumstances could any award exceed
100% of the marital estate. Id. at 59-63, 269 N.W.2d 768-771. Since DeWilt, the Wisconsin legis-
lature has repealed the statute relied upon by the appellate court. See infra note 25.
25. Divorce Reform Act, Wis. STAT. §§ 247.255, 247.26 (West 1977). Section 247.26, the
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maintenance provision which was in effect at the time of the Lundberg decision provides in perti-
nent part:
(1) Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in rendering
a judgment in an action under § 247.02(l)(g) or (j), the court may grant an order requir-
ing maintenance payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after
considering:
(a) The length of the marriage.
(b) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(c) The distribution of property made under § 247.555.
(d) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the
action is commenced.
(e) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational
background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the
job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employ-
ment,
(f) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at
a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if
so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(g) The tax consequences to each party.
(h) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage, ac-
cording to the terms of which one party has made financial or service contributions to the
other with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the future, where
such repayment has not been made, or any mutual agreement made by the parties before
or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial support of the par-
ties.
(i) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
Id.
The Divorce Reform Act added § 247.255, which established provisions for property division.
Section 247.255 provided in pertinent part:
The court shall presume that all other property except inherited property is to be divided
equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital
misconduct after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic
value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earn-
ing power of the other.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job mar-
ket, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-support-
ing at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the mar-
riage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under § 257.26 granting maintenance
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enumerated in the property division statute,26 Chief Justice Beilfuss,
writing for the court, determined that the factor concerning "[t]he con-
tribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning
capacity of the other"'27 controlled.28 Thus, the court concluded that if
substantial marital assets exist, a court may award a larger share of the
estate to the working spouse.29
The court recognized, however, that the Lundbergs owned few mari-
tal assets. Therefore, the maintenance statute provided the only poten-
tial vehicle for compensation.3" The court admitted that the Wisconsin
maintenance statute,31 unlike the property division statute,32 contained
payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments under
§ 247.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits,
vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage
concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be
binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the
terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume
any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
Id. (effective Jan. 15, 1978).
Sections 247.26 and 247.255 have since been renumbered as, respectively, Wis. STAT. §§ 767.26,
767.255 (1981). See 1979 Wis. Laws 50 (effective July 20, 1979). Section 767.26, the maintenance
statute, was subsequently amended to include subsection 9, which takes into account the contribu-
tions for one spouse to the education of the other.
Section 767.26 now provides in pertinent part:
Upon every judgment or annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in rendering a
judgment in an action under § 767.02(l)(g) or (j), the court may grant an order requiring
maintenance payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after
considering:
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning
power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(9)-(10) (West 1981) (effective Aug. 1, 1980). The amended statute did
not apply to the Lundberg proceeding, which was initiated on August 10, 1978.
26. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977). See supra note 25 for text.
27. Wis. STAT. § 247.255(5) (1977).
28. 107 Wis. 2d at 11, 318 N.W.2d at 923.
29. Id. at 10-12, 318 N.W.2d at 923-24.
30. Id. at 12, 318 N.W.2d at 923. The court added that because the parties had not acquired
a great deal of property, the trial court had allowed each party to keep what was in his or her
possession, and "[a]ccording to the trial court's valuation, the property awarded to David was
actually about $3,000 more valuable than that given to Judy." Id. This outcome further supports
the court's contention that maintenance payments are the better vehicle for compensation.
31. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977).
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no educational support provision. The factors enumerated in the main-
tenance statute, however, convinced the court that the legislature no
longer intended that maintenance payments be based solely on need.3
Because the statute authorized the trial court to consider all relevant
factors in determining its award, the supreme court concluded that the
lump-sum maintenance award clearly fell within the parameters of the
statute.34 Labeling the award maintenance may greatly affect the desir-
ability of the award, however, because it may be subject to subsequent
modification. 5
Justice Callow concurred with the majority in the compensation is-
sue.36 He argued, however, that the actual value of the wife's invest-
ment plus the value of her lost opportunities should serve as a ceiling
32. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977).
33. 107 Wis. 2d at 12-13, 318 Wis. 2d at 923. See also Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977). These
factors include: the distribution of property under the property division statute; the education
level of the parties; and the feasibility that the maintenance-seeking spouse will become self-sup-
porting at an income level comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. See supra note 25 for
text of statute.
34. 107 Wis. 2d at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
35. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.32 (West 1981) authorizes modification of maintenance awards.
It provides in pertinent part:
(1) After a judgment providing for child support under § 767.25, maintenance pay-
ments under § 767.26 or family support payments under § 767.261, or for the appoint-
ment of trustees under § 767.31 the court may, from time to time, on the petition of
either of the parties, or upon the petition of the department of health and social services,
a county welfare agency or a child support agency if an assignment has been made under
§ 49.19(4)(h) or if either party or their minor children receives aid under ch. 49, and
upon notice to the family court commissioner revise andalter such judgment respecting the
amount of such maintenance or child support and the payment thereof, and also respect-
ing the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in
trust, and may make any judgment respecting any of the matters which such court might
have made in the original action, except that a judgment which waives maintenance pay-
mentsfor eitherparty shall not thereafter be revised or altered in that respect nor shall the
provisions of a judgment with respect to final division ofproperty be subject to revision or
modpication....
(3) After a final judgment requiring maintenance payment has been rendered and the
payee has remarried the court shall, on application of thepayer with notice to thepayee and
upon proof of remarriage, vacate the order requiring such payments.
(4) In any case in which the state is a real party in interest under § 767.075, the
department of health and social services shall review the support obligation periodically
and whenever circumstances so warrant, petition the court for revision of the judgment
with respect to the support obligation.
Id. (emphasis added).
36. "[A] spouse is entitled to receive compensation for being the breadwinner and for those
lost opportunities which result from sacrifices made while supporting the spouse who obtained an
advanced education." Id. at 15, 318 N.W.2d at 925 (Callow, J., concurring).
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for any award.37 Specifically rejecting any computation based on fu-
ture earnings, 38 he categorized the degree as marital property.39 The
concurring justice considered this alternative more desirable because
an event such as the death of either spouse or remarriage of the depen-
dent spouse may terminate the maintenance payments prior to receipt
of the full value of the degree.40
The Lundberg court avoided the difficult question of valuation of the
working spouse's contribution. At trial, Mrs. Lundberg presented, but
did not use, an economist's valuation.4" Instead, she requested an
amount which she subjectively believed equalled the value of her sup-
port.42 The supreme court considered the lower court's award "fair and
equitable" under the circumstances43 and, therefore, did not have to
consider any method for valuing compensation or an upper limit to
such compensation.'
37. Id at 15, 318 N.W.2d at 925 (Callow, J., concurring).
38. Id at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925 (Callow, J., concurring). Justice Callow rejected the future
earnings method of valuation, stating that it "is too speculative to be judicially recognizable." He
pointed out that there is no certainty that the degree holder will actually practice in the chosen
field, or even earn the amounts the economist predicted. Id at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925 (Callow, J.,
concurring). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
39. 107 Wis. 2d at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925 (Callow, J., concurring). See also supra notes 18-23.
40. 107 Wis. 2d at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925. See Wis. STAT. ANN. 767.32 (West 1981) supra
note 35.
Justice Callow failed to recognize, however, that property settlements are dischargeable in
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 lists certain debts which are nondischargeable.
I1 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. IV 1980). The statute lists alimony and child support as nondischargeable
debts, id § 523(a)(5). Because it does not list marital property divisions, these debts may be
discharged. Erickson, supra note 9, at 965 n.80. See generally Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic
Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231 (1976).
Another potential disadvantage of a property settlement arises from the extent to which courts
are bound by the type of property distribution statute in effect in their jurisdiction. The Lundberg
court did not face this obstacle because Wisconsin is an equitable distribution jurisdiction. See
supra note 11.
41. The economist employed two methods of valuing Mrs. Lundberg's investment. The first
method compared the average earnings of physicians with that of white males with other types of
graduate degrees. The difference was estimated to be approximately $624,400 over a 25-year pe-
riod. 107 Wis. 2d at 5, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
The second method calculated the amount the wife expended with interest, to support her hus-
band while he attended school, which, in the Lundberg's case, amounted to $33,077. Id. Since
Mrs. Lundberg did not rely on these figures, it is impossible to ascertain which, if either, the court
would have adopted.
42. Mrs. Lundberg requested $25,000. Id at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
43. 107 Wis. 2d at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925.
44. Inherent in classifying a degree as marital property is the necessity of valuing that asset.
Because the wife's award depends upon the degree's determined value, assigning no value to that
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The Lundberg court correctly interpreted the Divorce Reform Act as
authorizing compensation for a working spouse. First, as the court
noted, the legislature clearly expressed its intent to compensate the
working spouse.45 Second, a subsection of the property division statute
explicitly lists the contribution of one spouse to the education of the
other as a factor for judicial consideration.46 Third, the flexibility of
the maintenance statute in effect at the time of the Lundberg decision
indicates the broad scope of circumstances the legislature intended to
cover.
4 7
Often, the working spouse seeking compensation upon divorce is left
without a legal remedy. Because courts traditionally base maintenance
upon need, they deny compensation to the self-supporting spouse.48
Property division statutes are equally ineffective because the working
spouse funnelled the major portion of income toward the other spouse's
education, in lieu of acquiring traditional marital assets.49 The degree-
earning spouse, on the other hand, can look forward to a bright
financial future because of the increased earning capacity which results
from the degree. By its broad interpretation of the maintenance stat-
ute, the Lundberg court awarded compensation without labeling the
degree property.
In authorizing compensation to Mrs. Lundberg, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court took an important step in recognizing the supporting
spouse's need to be compensated for the contributions made to the
marital relationship. Although the decision makes a limited contribu-
asset leaves the court with nothing to divide. Relying on statutory grounds, however, a court need
only consider the factors enumerated in the applicable statute to render an equitable award.
45. See supra note 25.
46. Wis. STAT. § 247.255(5) (1977), set out supra note 25. The fact that the Legislature had
already amended the maintenance statute to include such a provision lends support to the court's
interpretation.
47. See. e.g., Wis. STAT. § 247.26(c), (d), (f), (i) (1977); see supra note 25. See generally Com-
ment, The 1977 Amendments to the Wisconsin Family Code, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 882, 890 (author
speculates that the Wisconsin legislature intended courts to look to the maintenance as well as the
property division statute in compensating a supporting spouse).
48. Erickson, supra note 9, at 959. See supra note 33.
49. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 1131 (1969); In re Marriage
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979), Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). See supra notes 4 & 20.
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tion to this new area, it represents a growing commitment to the fair
and equitable treatment of spouses upon divorce.
J R.H.
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